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Abstract
We introduce a new representation for monitored behavior of malicious soft-
ware called Malware Instruction Set (MIST). The representation is optimized for
effective and efficient analysis of behavior using data mining and machine learn-
ing techniques. It can be obtained automatically during analysis of malware with a
behavior monitoring tool or by converting existing behavior reports. The represen-
tation is not restricted to a particular monitoring tool and thus can also be used as a
meta language to unify behavior reports of different sources.
1 Introduction
The field of malicious software (malware) is one of the most active and also one of
the most challenging areas of computer security. In recent years, we are observing a
huge increase in the number of malware samples collected by anti-virus vendors [7, 13].
Therefore, it is mandatory that we develop tools and techniques to analyze malware
samples with no or very limited human interaction.
Typically, we distinguish between static and dynamicmalware analysis as well as, in
the field of the latter one, also between code and behavior analysis. Code analysis can be
performed in a static way by using a disassembler or decompiler and also dynamically
by the usage of a debugger. The main advantage of code analysis is that we can obtain
a complete overview of what a given software does. However, code analysis is often
obstructed by evasion techniques, such as binary packers, polymorphism and anti-debug
techniques [6, 8, 9]. In behavior analysis, the malware is seen as a black box and only
its effects to the system, its behavior, is analyzed. This can be achieved by several
existing monitoring tools. Most of these tools monitor one specific group of operation,
e.g. registry or filesystem accesses. But there are also comprehensive analysis suites,
which perform an overall monitoring of all of the malware’s operations [2, 12, 14]. These
suites execute a malware sample in a controlled environment and record all system-level
behavior by monitoring the performed system calls. As a result, an analysis report is
created summarizing the observed behavior of the sample. In contrast to code analysis,
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behavior-based dynamic analysis suffers less from evasion and obfuscation techniques,
as the code is not examined at all. Of course, there are different techniques, which can
be used to prevent or falsify behavior analysis [11].
To handle the increasing amount and diversity of malware, dynamic analysis can be
combined with clustering and classification algorithms. A behavior-based clustering of
malware helps to find new malware families. Tagging new families at an early stage is
essential to effectually fight them. Unlike clustering, the classification of malware does
not provide information about new families, but helps to assign unknown malware to
known families. Thus, classification of malware filters unknown samples and thereby
reduces the costs of analysis. This combination of dynamic analysis and machine learn-
ing techniques has been recently studied in different scenarios [e.g., 1, 3, 4, 5, 10].
For effective and efficient analysis, however, algorithms and data representations
need to be adjusted to each other, such that discriminative patterns in data are accessible
to learning methods. In this article, we introduce a new behavior representation—the
Malware Instruction Set (MIST)—which is exclusively designed for efficacy of analysis
using data mining and machine learning techniques. It can be obtained automatically
during analysis of malware with a behavior monitoring analysis tool or by converting
existing behavior reports. The representation is not restricted to a particular report layout
and thus can also be used as a meta language to unify behavior reports of different
sources. Empirically, we demonstrate the accurate representation of behavior realized
by MIST, while significantly reducing the size of reports and stored instructions.
This article is organized as follows: the Malware Instruction Set is introduced in
Section 2. In Section 3 we present a short empirical evaluation of MIST and demonstrate
its capabilities. Section 4 concludes the article.
2 The Malware Instruction Set
The majority of monitoring suites, such as Anubis [2] and CWSandbox [14], employ
textual or XML-based formats to store the monitored behavior of malware. While such
formats are suitable for a human analyst, they are inappropriate for further automatic
analysis. The structured and often aggregated reports hinder application of machine
learning. On the one hand, the XML representations are often too rich, providing an
over-specific view on behavior which is not appropriate for finding generic behavioral
patterns. On the other hand, textual formats are too coarse due to aggregation and simpli-
fication, such that involved patterns of behavior are not visible. Moreover, the complex-
ity of textual representations increases the size of reports and thus negatively impacts
run-time of analysis.
To address this problem and optimize processing of reports, we propose a special
representation of behavior denoted as Malware Instruction Set (MIST) inspired from
instruction sets used in processor design. In contrast to textual and XML-based for-
mats, the monitored behavior of a malware binary is described as a sequence of instruc-
tions, where individual execution flows of threads and processes are grouped in a single,
sequential report. Each instruction in this format encodes one monitored system call
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and its arguments using short numeric identifiers, such as ‘03 05’ for the system call
‘move file’. The system call arguments are arranged in different levels of blocks, re-
flecting behavior with different degree of granularity. We denote these levels as MIST
levels. Moreover, variable-length arguments, such as file and mutex names, are repre-
sented by index numbers, where a global mapping table is used to translate between the
original contents and the index numbers.
 CATEGORY OPERATION | ARGBLOCK1 | ARGBLOCK2 | ...  | ARGBLOCKN
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Figure 1: Schematic depiction of a MIST instruction. The field CATEGORY encodes the
category of system calls where the field OPERATION reflects a particular system call.
Arguments are represented as ARGBLOCKs.
Figure 1 shows the basic structure of a MIST instruction. The first level of the
instructions corresponds to the category and name of a monitored system call. For
example, ‘03 05’ corresponds to the category filesystem (03) and the system call
‘move file’ (05). The following levels of the instruction contain different blocks of
arguments, where the specificity of the blocks increases from left to right. The main
idea underlying this rearrangement is to move “noisy” elements, such as temporary file-
names, to the end of an instruction, whereas stable and discriminative patterns, such as
directory and mutex names, are kept at the beginning. Thus, the granularity of behavior-
based analysis can be adapted by considering instructions only up to a certain level. As
a result, malware sharing similar behavior may be even discovered if minor parts of the
instructions differ, for instance, if randomized file names are used.
After introducing the main concept of MIST, we describe the concrete representa-
tion for several selected system calls. Since MIST features 120 unique calls with their
corresponding attributes, we can not describe all of them, but restrict ourselves to some
representative examples to explain the overall design philosophy.
2.1 MIST Design
Every MIST report consists of several MIST instructions, which encode individual sys-
tem calls monitored during run-time of a malware binary. While MIST can be obtained
directly during dynamic analysis of a malware binary, we herein focus on translation
of XML-based reports generated by the analysis tool CWSandbox [14] to MIST. This
conversion is order preserving, i.e., all contained MIST instructions occur in the same
order as they were originally monitored and reported by CWSandbox.
As introduced previously, MIST instructions are composed of different fields: a
CATEGORY field, an OPERATION field, and several ARGBLOCK fields. The field CATEGORY
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encodes the global class of the MIST instruction. As shown in Table 1, we distin-
guish between 20 different categories. Each category groups a set of related opera-
tions, e.g., the ‘winsock op’ category contains 13 MIST instructions, including the
‘create socket’, ‘connect socket’, and ‘send socket’ instructions. These in-
structions encode all system calls which are required to performWinsock based network
communication.
Category # syscalls Category # syscalls
01 Windows COM 4 0B Windows Services 11
02 DLL Handling 3 0C System 2
03 Filesystem 14 0D Systeminfo 7
04 ICMP 1 0E Thread 3
05 Inifile 5 0F User 8
06 Internet Helper 5 10 Virtual Memory 5
07 Mutex 2 11 Window 5
08 Network 6 12 Winsock 13
09 Registry 9 13 Protected Storage 9
0A Process 7 14 Windows Hooks 1
Table 1: MIST categories and encoding as well as the number of contained unique oper-
ations within each category
The amount and type of ARGBLOCKs for each MIST instruction depends on the par-
ticular system call. We will give some examples for those later in this text. We im-
plement the concept of using MIST levels by dividing the ordered attribute blocks of
each MIST operation into several levels, with higher level containing attributes with a
higher variability and lower levels those which are more constant. The term variability
is used with respect to different monitored behavior in multiple executions of one and
the same sample, or executions of different variants from the same family. For example,
if a monitored application creates a file in the Windows temp directory in one execution,
it is highly likely that it will also create such a file in the very same folder in a second
execution. In contrast to that, it is also likely that a different file name will be used,
since temporary files are normally using random file names. Consequently, in a MIST
operation we would encode the fact, that a file is created in level one, the target file path
in level two, and the ultimate file name in level three.
The rationale underlying this rearragangement is that if we look at two executions
of the similar programs on a lower level, e.g., level one, we observe identical behavior,
whereas if we look on a higher level value, we are able to detect fine differences, e.g., in
file names. This form of file name decomposition is strictly used in the MIST transfor-
mation: each file name is split up into the components file type, file path, file
name, and parameter. In most cases the file type and file path are stored on a
lower level than the rest, since these are more robust than other parts of file names.
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2.2 Examples
load dll. The ‘load dll’ system call is executed by every software during process
initialization and run-time several times, since under Windows, dynamic-link libraries
(DLLs) are used to implement the Windows subsystem and offer an interface to the
operating system.
Figure 2 shows the original XML element of the CWSandbox representation and
its corresponding MIST representation of one ‘load dll’ operation. Except for the
attribute filename hash, all attributes are transfused into the MIST representation. We
sometimes discard some attributes, if they are not useful for later analysis steps. To
achieve a case insensitive transformation, all attribute values are converted to lower case
first. Then we apply a fast hash function, such as the standard ELF, and store the results
in a lookup table. Finally, the resulting lookup index is used in our MIST representation
as a hexadecimal number.
<load_dll filename="C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll" successful="1"
address="#7C800000" end_address="#7C908000" size="1081344"
filename_hash="c88d57cc99f75cd928b47b6e444231f26670138f"/>
(a) CWSandbox representation
02 02  | 00006b2c 0c7d3f9c | 00108000 0c94b872 | 00000000 7C800000 7C908000 10
load_dll size"dll"
"c:\windows\system32\"
"kernel32"
parameter
address end_address
successful
(b) MIST representation
Figure 2: Feature representations of system call ‘load dll’. The CWSandbox format
represents the system call as an attributed XML element, while the malware instruction
set (MIST) represents it as a structured string.
For the ‘load dll’ instruction we order the attributes as follows: the first attributes
are the file extension and file path of the library. This information is quite con-
stant and, therefore, is included in the second MIST level. Note that we order all at-
tributes with respect to their variability. On level three we store the file size and the
file name of the library. Both of these values may differ when two different variants
of the same program are considered and, therefore, should only be stored on a lower—
hence more detailed—MIST level.
It is evident from this example that the MIST instruction is more suitable for data
mining and machine learning techniques than the traditional XML representation. The
compact encoding ensures a proper comparability between all ‘load dll’ instructions
and the ordering of all attributes permits the introduction of MIST levels, which finally
enhances the quality of analysis.
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connect socket. If a malware binary initiates a TCP network communication via the
Winsock library, it has to perform the ‘connect socket’ system call. Figure 3 shows
a monitored system call in CWSandbox and MIST representation. The sandbox records
five parameters for this system call, namely the used socket number, the IP address
and port of the remote server, the winsock result value and the successful flag,
which states if the connection could be established or not.
<connect_socket socket="1500" remote_addr="192.168.1.163" remote_port="25"
successful="1" winsock_result="10035"/>
(a) CWSandbox representation
12 0a | 0019 | 025d0ce6 | 00343365 10
connect_socket
remote_port winsock_result
remote_address successful
(b) MIST representation
Figure 3: Feature representations of system call ‘connect socket’. The CWSand-
box format represents the system call as an attributed XML element, while the malware
instruction set (MIST) represents it as a structured string.
Except for the socket number, all attributes are converted into MIST representa-
tion (the socket number is a dynamic value that is created by the operating system and
has no further semantic meaning). Furthermore, the attributes are ordered as show in
Figure 3(b). Since the IP address of the remote server and the Winsock result value
may vary quite often, this information is less interesting for our purpose and, therefore,
moved into the third respectively fourth MIST level. Only the remote port remains in
the second MIST level of this instruction.
move file. The third example is one of the most complex conversions. As already
shown, we decompose the file names and only use the file paths and extensions on the
second MIST level, and delay the ultimate file names and possible parameters to a higher
level. For the ‘move file’ call we have one filename-attribute that specifies the source
file, and another one for the destination file. Thus, we have to split and arrange
two file names. Figure 4 shows a monitored ‘move file’ system call in CWSandbox
and MIST notation.
Again, the hash values are not converted into the MIST representation, because the
malware binary may change, e.g., in discharge of the used packer. Therefore, only the
ultimate file names and the parameters are those converted attributes which are not con-
tained in the second MIST level, see Figure 4. In contrast to the file names and all prior
discussed attributes, the values of the filetype, the desiredaccess, and the flags
attributes are not hashed while converting into MIST representation, but transferred di-
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<move_file filetype="file" srcfile="C:\DOKU...\Temp\&#x7E;5.tmp.exe"
srcfile_hash="hash_error"
dstfile="C:\WINDOWS\system32\nxzhpxgdmwuod.exe"
dstfile_hash="hash_error" desiredaccess="FILE_ANY_ACCESS"
flags="MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING"/>
(a) CWSandbox representation
03 04  | 00 400000 01 00006ce5 0d7ac98c 00006ce5 0c7d3f9c | 08d0f2f0 00000000 0bb41dc4 00000000
move_file "c:\dok...\temp\"
creationdistribution
flags "exe"
parameterfiletype
"exe"
"c:\windows\system32\"
"&#x7E;5.tmp" "nxzhpxgdmwuod"
parameter
(b) MIST representation
Figure 4: Feature representations of system call ‘move file’. The CWSandbox format
represents the system call as an attributed XML element, while the malware instruction
set (MIST) represents it as a structured string.
rectly into the MIST instruction. Since all possible values are known in advance, we use
a fix mapping between the attribute values and the MIST values. Table 2 shows a frag-
ment of the mapping table of the flags attribute. There are 26 predefined values which
are freely combinable.
Value MIST bit vectors
FILE ATTRIBUTE ARCHIVE 00000000000000000000000001
FILE ATTRIBUTE COMPRESSED 00000000000000000000000010
FILE ATTRIBUTE HIDDEN 00000000000000000000000100
FILE ATTRIBUTE NORMAL 00000000000000000000001000
FILE ATTRIBUTE OFFLINE 00000000000000000000010000
... ...
MOVEFILE WRITE THROUGH 00100000000000000000000000
MOVEFILE CREATE HARDLINK 01000000000000000000000000
MOVEFILE FAIL IF NOT TRACKABLE 10000000000000000000000000
Table 2: Mapping between CWSandbox and MIST representation for possible values of
the flags attribute.
For attributes like flags or desiredaccess, we sum up the corresponding MIST
bit vectors. The result is then interpreted as numeric value and transformed into hexadec-
imal encoding. This approach is robust against permutations between the single values
and allows re-translating of the MIST encoding.
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3 Empirical Evaluation
We now proceed to present an empirical evaluation of the MIST representation. For this
evaluation, we consider a small sample of 500 malware binaries which have been ob-
tained from the CWSandbox web site available at http://cwsandbox.org. The mal-
ware binaries have been collected over a period of more than two years from a variety of
sources, such as honeypots, spam traps, anti-malware vendors, and security researchers.
From the overall database, we select a subset of binaries which have been assigned to
a known class of malware by the majority of six independent anti-virus products. Al-
though anti-virus labels suffer from inconsistency [1], we expect the selection using dif-
ferent scanners to be reasonable consistent and accurate. The labeled malware binaries
are then executed and monitored using CWSandbox, resulting in a total of 500 behavior
reports of 5 common malware classes.
For each report we consider four different representations of behavior: First, the
original XML format as generated by CWSandbox, second an extended version of the
XML format proposed by Rieck et al. [10] and, third and forth, the MIST representation
of behavior for level 1 and level 2.
3.1 Behavior Representation
In this first experiment we compare the utility of MIST for representing malware behav-
ior in a concise form. In particular, we apply the technique for embedding textual data
of malware reports to a vector space introduced by Rieck et al. [10]. That is, each report
is represented by a vector, such that the similarity of behavior can be assessed in terms
of geometric distances.
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(c) MIST level 2
Figure 5: Comparison of feature representations for malware behavior. Distance matri-
ces for the behavior of five malware families are shown, each represented by ten reports.
Dark shading indicates small distances and light shading large distances.
Figure 5 shows results for the representation using different formats. Distance ma-
trices are shown for three behavior representations, where dark color indicates low dis-
tances and light color high distances. The extended XML format is omitted, as it only
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marginally differs from the regular XML representation. The representation provided by
XML data is not sufficient to reflect all presented classes of malware. For the two mal-
ware families ALLAPLE and LOOPER the distance matrix for the XML data shows very
light colored sections. Thus, the distance between the individual behavior reports is huge
which precludes a good clustering or classification based on XML data. A threshold to
classify all ALLAPLE members correctly would be too low for other malware families,
for example, PODNUHA and SWIZZOR would also be classified as ALLAPLE.
The distance matrices for the MIST encoded data show a much darker coloration
along the diagonal. The members of the individual malware families are much closer
to each other, resulting in almost black colored sections for four malware families using
MIST level 1 representation. Overall the distance matrix for MIST level 1 shows the
closest match within the malware families, but in exchange also shows matches among
different malware families, e.g., BANCOS and SWIZZOR. For MIST level 2 represen-
tation, we reduce the noise between the families at the cost of a sligthly less accurate
separation between classes. This reduction of noise results from the more detailed infor-
mation contained in MIST level2.
This experiment demonstrates the good representation of behavior realized byMIST.
Although we have only studied five classes of malware, it is evident that MIST is more
suitable for behavior-based analysis than XML, as samples of the same malware classes
exhibiting similar behavior are close to each other in the vector space.
3.2 Data Reduction
In the second experiment we compare the size of instructions and reports between XML-
based formats and MIST. Figure 6 shows a comparison for the four considered formats,
namely the original XML format of CWSandbox, an extended representation used by
Rieck et al. [10], and MIST level 1 and 2.
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Figure 6: Comparison of feature representations for malware behavior in terms of size.
The MIST representation significantly reduces both the length of the reports, as well
as, the average length of instructions. While reports in XML format on average comprise
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more than 450 kilobytes, for MIST level 1 only 100 kilobytes and for MIST level 2 300
kilobytes are necessary to store the same behavior – though with a different granular-
ity. Similarly, for the size of instructions MIST provides a more concise representation,
where on average instruction requires less than 40 bytes. By contrast, for both XML
formats the required size per instruction is twice as large, yielding over 80 bytes. Par-
ticularly with regard to data mining and machine learning methods this data reduction is
quite important, since it dramatically reduces the run-time of analysis on large datasets.
This experiment demonstrates the advantages of representing behavior using the pro-
posed MIST representation. The behavior is represented in a way which allows far better
to discriminate classes, but at the same time storage size is significantly reduced, which
ultimately provides the basis for effective and efficient further analysis of monitored
malware behavior.
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4 Conclusions
The Malware Instruction Set (MIST) is a meta language for monitored behavior, which
can be used to make the results of different behavior monitoring systems more compara-
ble. In addition, the MIST representation is optimized for analysis of software behavior
using data mining and machine learning techniques. We restrict all instructions to sig-
nificant attributes only and rearrange these attributes to achieve a well sorted ordering
which allows the introduction of accuracy levels. Furthermore, we reduce the size of
the reports by encoding each instruction and attribute with the help of hash tables. In
summary, using the MIST representation as input enhances both the run-time and the
results of data mining and machine learning analysis.
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